Hunting Malicious Bots on Twitter: An Unsupervised Approach

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How Twitter Bots Help Fuel Political Feuds

Agenda

- Problem: Identifying Twitter bots and spammers who create those bots
    a. Significance of problem
    b. Existing approaches
    c. Shortcomings of existing approaches
- Contribution: Designed and implemented a **group based unsupervised** algorithm that effectively detects bots and **spam campaigns**
- Results and findings
- Use Cases
    1. Hong Kong #UmbrellaRevolution
    2. #ReleaseTheMemo
- Future work

Why focus on Twitter bots

Impersonation: 2016 US Election tweet collection



Severity of the problem

Bots are a major presence on Twitter

- 9-15% of Twitter accounts are bots[1]
- 50% of tweet traffic generated by bots[2]

Bots violate Twitter's terms of service

- Send spam (click-bait, affiliate marketing)[3]
- Send malware
- Interfere with elections[4]

[1] O. Varol, E. Ferrara, C. A. Davis, F. Menczer, and A. Flammini, "Online human-bot interactions: Detection, estimation, and characterization," 2017.

[2] Z. Gilani, J. Crowcroft, R. Farahbakhsh, and G. Tyson, "The implications of twitterbot generated data traffic on networked systems," in Proceedings of the SIGCOMM Posters and Demos, ser. SIGCOMM Posters and Demos '17. New York, NY, USA. 2017

[3] Bessi, A., & Ferrara, E. (2016). Social bots distort the 2016 U.S. Presidential election online discussion. First Monday. 2016.

[4] K. Thomas, C. Grier, D. Song, and V. Paxson, "Suspended Accounts in Retrospect: An Analysis of Twitter Spam," in Proceedings of the 2011 ACM SIGCOMM Conference on Internet Measurement Conference, IMC '11, (New York, NY, USA), pp. 243–258, ACM, 2011.

Existing bot detection methods

Two major approaches

- **Supervised approaches** that learn to classify bots based on a number of structural and behavioral features of bots.
- **Unsupervised approaches** that use a programmed protocol based on pre-defined behavioral features.

Features for detection

- Behavioral: temporal tweeting patterns[1][2]
- Structural: number of tweets[1], shortened URL usage[3]

……

[1] Davis, C. A., Varol, O., Ferrara, E., Flammini, A., & Menczer, F. (2016, April). BotOrNot: A system to evaluate social bots. In Proceedings of the 25th International Conference Companion on World Wide Web (pp. 273-274). International World Wide Web Conferences Steering Committee Available: https://arxiv.org/abs/1602.00975

[2] Z. Chu, S. Gianvecchio, H. Wang, and S. Jajodia, "Detecting automation of twitter accounts: Are you a human, bot, or cyborg?" IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, vol. 9, no. 6, pp. 811–824, Nov 2012.

[3] D. Wang, S. B. Navathe, L. Liu, D. Irani, A. Tamersoy, and C. Pu, "Click traffic analysis of short url spam on twitter," in 9th IEEE International Conference on Collaborative Computing: Networking, Applications and Worksharing, Oct 2013, pp. 250–259.

Existing bot detection methods

	Supervised
Human intervention	Yes
Unit of detection	Individual
State-of-art Application	BotOrNot[1]

[1] Davis, C. A., Varol, O., Ferrara, E., Flammini, A., & Menczer, F. (2016, April). BotOrNot: A system to evaluate social bots. In Proceedings of the 25th International Conference Companion on World Wide Web (pp. 273-274).

[2] N. Chavoshi, H. Hamooni, and A. Mueen, "Debot: Twitter bot detection via warped correlation," in 2016 IEEE 16th International Conference on Data Mining (ICDM), Dec 2016.

BotOrNot: Ambiguous probability model



Most scores fall in the range of 0.4 to 0.6 (uncertainty)

Existing bot detection methods

	Supervised
Human intervention	Yes
Unit of detection	Individual
State-of-art Application	BotOrNot[1]
Bot accounts overlapped with our protocol	N/A

[1] Davis, C. A. et al, 2016

[2] N. Chavoshi et al, 2016

Existing bot detection methods

	Supervised	Unsupervised
Human intervention	Yes	No
Unit of detection	Individual	Group
State-of-art Application	BotOrNot[1]	DeBot[2]
Overlap with bots detected by our protocol	N/A	Mean 11.69% Std 7.48%

[1] Davis, C. A. et al, 2016

[2] N. Chavoshi et al, 2016

New unsupervised approach

Detect **groups** of accounts tweeting **similar texts** over a long period of time

Why? Duplicate tweeting is widely used to send spam, to bait user into visiting sides and to inflate SEO results.

Collect tweets with **embedded (shortened) URLs**

Why focus on shortened URLs?



How system detects bots



How system detects bots

Algorithm 1 Algorithm for detecting botnets

Input: α (minimum duplicate factor), β (overlap ratio),

a group G of n accounts $a_1, \ldots, a_n$,

sets $T(a_1), \ldots, T(a_n)$ of tweets where $T(a_i) = \{t_{i1}, \ldots, t_{i200}\}$ of the 200 most recent tweets for each account $a_i, 1 \leq i \leq n$

1: $C = \emptyset$ /* *most frequent tweet set* */

2: $S = \emptyset$ /* *bot account set* */

3: **for** each user $a_i \in G$ **do**

4: **if** $(|\{i \mid t \in T(a_i); 1 \leq i \leq n\}| \geq \alpha)$ **then**

5: $C = C \cup \{t\}$

6: **end if**

7: **end for**

8: **for** each user $a_i \in G$ **do**

9: **if** $(a_i \in S \iff \frac{|T(a_i) \cap C|}{|T(a_i)|} \geq \beta)$ **then**

10: $S = S \cup \{a_i\}$

Step 1: construct a set of common tweets (α)

Step 2: find users whose tweets overlap with the common set (β)

Experimental Results[1] (500,000 tweets/URL)

URL Shortening Services	Total # of accounts	Total # of bots	% bots suspended by Twitter until 6/10/17	% bots suspended by Twitter until 7/17/17	% bots suspended by Twitter until 9/25/17
bit.ly	28964	696	3.74%	4.74%	8.9%
ift.tt	12543	321	2.80%	9.97%	10.59%
ow.ly	28416	894	45.30%	48.21%	48.43%
tinyurl.com	20005	705	5.39%	7.66%	12.34%
dld.bz	6893	304	8.22%	11.84%	18.75%
viid.me	2605	129	38.76%	55.81%	63.57%
goo.gl	11250	710	0.42%	3.24%	7.04%
dlvr.it	15122	1194	7.37%	9.13%	9.46%
ln.is	25384	5857	1.11%	1.25%	1.50%

[1] Z. Chen, R. S. Tanash, R. Stoll, and D. Subramanian, Hunting Malicious Bots on Twitter: An Unsupervised Approach. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017, pp. 501–510. [Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67256-4 40

New Data Collection (2 month study)

- 70+ days (09/02/2017 to 11/14/2017)
- 7 URL shortening services
- 30000 tweets collected per service per day

Bot traffic accounts for **10-50%** of tweets with shortened URLs



From bot group to spam campaign



From bot group to spam campaign



From bot group to spam campaign



From bot group to spam campaign



From bot group to spam campaign



From botnet to spam campaign

From 09/02/2017 to 11/14/2017	
# bot accounts identified	200,379
# bot groups	7,350
# suspicious registrants	848



Giuseppe Malfitano	Shashank Vaishnav	Proxy Server
i5-**news**.com	**awesome**nature.info	newbuye.**review**
a6-**news**.com	**awesome**pix.info	vidisp.**review**
a8-**news**.com	**awesome**post.info	superdoppy.**review**
i5-**news**.com	**awesome**stuff.info	situari.**review**
i7-**news**.com	**awesome**thingz.info	sacraffm.**review**

From botnet to spam campaign



Case study 1: #UmbrellaRevolution

Remove bots for community detection

Case study 2: #ReleaseTheMemo

Track how bots interfere with political discussions

Case study 1: #UmbrellaRevolution

- **Background**: The Umbrella Revolution was a large scale social movement in Hong Kong started in late September 2014 and ended in December 2014.

- **Goal**: Understand human interaction on social media.

- **Challenge**:
  - Design a filtering mechanism to remove bots.
  - Community detection using tweet-retweet graph

Case study 1: # UmbrellaRevolution

- Collected live tweets from Streaming API
- Time collected: 10/06/2014 – 12/08/2014
- # tweets collected: 1,062,606

Right: daily tweet volume. Peaks correspond with major events.



Case study 1: # UmbrellaRevolution

Tweet-retweet graph of raw (not filtered) dataset

1. Influential nodes are news media @WSJ, @TIME, @SCMP_News

2. Need to filter out non-human nodes



- likely to be human
- not likely to be human
- verified account

Case study 1: # UmbrellaRevolution

Data processing pipeline:

stage 1: filter out bots

stage 2: collect more human tweets



Case study 1: # UmbrellaRevolution

Tweet-retweet graph of journalist community

- Journalists 44% nodes



Case study 1: # UmbrellaRevolution

Tweet-retweet graph of activist community

- Activists 56% nodes



Case study 1: # UmbrellaRevolution

Tweet-retweet graph of both communities

- Journalists 44% nodes
- Activists 56% nodes



Case study 1: # UmbrellaRevolution

What we learn:

There are two major communities discussing this event on Twitter

Top three news accounts (**journalist**)

Top three pro-protest accounts (**activist**)

Case study 2: #ReleaseTheMemo

Goal: Track activities of political bots

#ReleaseTheMemo exploded on Twitter

On Feb. 2, 2018, the United States House Intelligence Committee Chairman Devin Nunes, released a controversial memo

Datasets	pre memoday	memoday	post memoday
# Tweets	99999	253383	54424
Duration	3h:25m:16s	4h:10m:12s	4h:28m:04s

Case study 2: #ReleaseTheMemo

Datasets	#accounts	#bot accounts	%bot accounts	%bot tweets
pre memoday	36347	4030	11.1	18.9
memoday	67654	11254	13.1	26.7
post memoday	30764	3718	12.1	15.9

Number of bots and bot tweets in three dataset. Bot activities peaked on **memoday**

Case study 2: #ReleaseTheMemo

Bots retweet from

Verified account
@dbongino

Parody account
@sean_spicier

Influential bots
@DanCovfefe1

#ReleaseTheMemo – Pre memoday



- Normal Accounts 87.07%

#ReleaseTheMemo – Pre memoday



- Normal Accounts 87.07%
- Normal Bots 12.36%
- Influential Bots 0.14%

times retweeted > 50

#ReleaseTheMemo – Pre memoday



	Pro-Trump	Anti-Trump
Normal Bots	88%	12%
Influential Bots	100%	0%

Normal Accounts	87.07%
Normal Bots	12.36%
Influential Bots	0.14%
Verified Accounts	0.43%



@sean_spicier: not the real Spicer!
(word is misspelled)

#ReleaseTheMemo – Memoday



#ReleaseTheMemo – Memoday



#ReleaseTheMemo – Memoday

	Pro-Trump	Anti-Trump
Normal Bots	68%	32%
Influential Bots	100%	0%



Normal Accounts	85.43%
Normal Bots	14.11%
Influential Bots	0.07%
Verified Accounts	0.38%



@TheRealJulian: not the real Julian!

#ReleaseTheMemo – Post memoday

- Normal Accounts 87.10%



#ReleaseTheMemo – Post memoday

- Normal Accounts 87.10%
- Normal Bots 12.73%
- Influential Bots 0.02%



#ReleaseTheMemo – Post memoday

- Normal Accounts 87.10%
- Normal Bots 12.73%
- Influential Bots 0.02%
- Verified Accounts 0.14%

	Pro-Trump	Anti-Trump
Normal Bots	55%	45%
Influential Bots	100%	0%



@DTrumpPoll: Impartial polls about Trump

Case study 2: #ReleaseTheMemo

What do we observe?

- 15% of pro-Trump cluster are bots and 13% of anti-Trump cluster are bots.

- Bots are artificially making trending hashtags
  21% #ReleaseTheMemo, 24% #MemoDay,
  92% # SecretSociety, 34% #IAmNOTaRussianBot
  tweets are generated by bots.

- There are still bots in the dataset that we do not identify. Having access to account registration information would be helpful.

Application, Action and Impact of our bot detection work

Bot Detection (Impact)

1. Application: Twitter Bot Monitor
   - Backend: Bot Detection, Spam Campaign Detection, API
   - Frontend: Bot Visualization, Bot Trend Monitor, Trending URL Monitor
   - To date, our Twitter Bot Monitor is still tracking and collecting suspicious accounts (http://water.clear.rice.edu:18000/)

2. Publications
   - Paper published on 2017 International Conference on Social Informatics
   - Presented our work at Oxford University, UK
   - Another paper submitted to IEEE transactions on intelligent systems is under review

Bot Detection (Impact)



Online discussion on Twitter

Bot Detection (Impact)

MOTHERBOARD VICE

Why Twitter Is the Best Social Media Platform for Disinformation

estimated that **up to 15 percent** of all Twitter accounts are bots. In September, **another study** from Rice University put the number at up to 23 percent, out of a global active user base of **approximately 330 million**.

Media coverage, paper cited by *Vice* (November 1, 2017)
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/bj7vam/why-twitter-is-the-best-social-media-platform-for-disinformation

Contact and response

I reached out to:

- URL Shortening Services (bitly, tiny url, hootsuite, tiny cc, dlvr, ifttt)
- Domain registrars (Namecheap, GoDaddy)
- Domain hosting services (Tiggee, Liquid Web, Digital Ocean)
- Google Network Abuse Team, Google Safe Browsing
- Social Media Company (Twitter, last December)

Contact and response

URL Shortening Services

bitly

Tinyg

IFTTT

dlvr.it

Hootsuite

TINY >URL

Domain Registrars

namecheap

GoDaddy™

Web Hosting Services

Liquid Web™

DigitalOcean

Browser Services

Google Safe Browsing

Twitter

Contact and response (Four responded)

URL Shortening Services

Domain Registrars

Web Hosting Services

Browser Services

Twitter

Namecheap replied, but said cannot take action

Thank you for the detailed explanation of the issue.

Unfortunately, we were unable to validate your claim(s), since in this situation, Namecheap acts as the registrar only. Our ability to investigate the matter is limited since the content transmitted via the website is not located on our server.

Considering the aforementioned points, we recommend that you contact the hosting provider, who would be in a better position to validate your claim(s) and take the appropriate action. For your convenience, here are the contact details of the company that owns the IP-Addresses assigned to the subject domains: http://whois.domaintools.com/192.241.145.46

Additionally, if you believe you are aware of an attempted crime, you can file a complaint through Internet Crime Complaint Center at https://complaint.ic3.gov , who are in the best position to fully investigate any such issue across any/all service providers.

Please let us know should you have any further questions.

Tiny.cc replied and took down reported URLs

Hi Zhouhan,

Thanks for contacting me and thanks for your work on this project. If you have more suspicious domains, please share them. We have our own internal blacklist of domains that can be added to.

Abuse is probably the biggest challenge to running a free URL shortening service as abusers put a great amount of effort and ingenuity into new methods.

We have a large stack of filters to test each URL before it is allowed to be shortened. This "validation" stack includes checking against 3rd party blacklists (Google Safe Browsing API, DNS queries to SURBL, Spamhaus, etc.) Mostly checking and filtering at the domain level. But there are other patterns of abuse that we have recognized over the years and try to detect at the front and stop it before URL is shortened.
As you know, spam, phish and abuse is largely a reactive game, as there is no way to proactively know for sure how a URL will be used or abused.

Best regards,

Ow.ly replied but said Twitter should take action

Hi Zhouhan,

Thanks for reaching out.

We appreciate your efforts on reporting this kind of spammy behaviour. As for performing any action on the links, I'm afraid we can't just remove these links.

We do remove links that violate copyright or contain phishing/malware, but this kind of content is not agains our ToS. While we make efforts to detect bots on our system, we rely on the end social network (Twitter in this case) to be the one flagging and terminating the social media accounts.

Please forward us the whole list of suspicious domains and ow.ly links, so we can correlate with our users and monitor their activity.

Thanks again for your help.

Bit.ly did not reply, but took down reported URLs

STOP - there might be a problem with the requested link

The link you requested has been identified by bitly as being potentially problematic. This could be because a bitly user has reported a problem, a black-list service reported a problem, because the link has been shortened more than once, or because we have detected potentially malicious content. This may be a problem because:

- Some URL-shorteners re-use their links, so bitly can't guarantee the validity of this link.
- Some URL-shorteners allow their links to be edited, so bitly can't tell where this link will lead you.
- Spam and malware is very often propagated by exploiting these loopholes, neither of which bitly allows for.

The link you requested may contain inappropriate content, or even spam or malicious code that could be downloaded to your computer without your consent, or may be a forgery or imitation of another website, designed to trick users into sharing personal or financial information.

bitly suggests that you

- Change the original link, and re-shorten with bitly
- Close your browser window
- Notify the sender of the URL

Or, continue at your own risk to
http://www.sexyarb.com/vcdKNsycK.html

Reaching out to Twitter

- On December 7, 2017, we gave an internal presentation to Twitter Content Quality team and Data Science team

- Twitter thanked us for our work and presentation, and introduced us to data scientists and engineers working on anti-spam topics

Reaching out to Twitter

- On February 21, 2018, Twitter rolled out an update of its anti-spam policy[1]

- The policy explicitly tells Twitter service providers "***Do not (and do not allow your users to) simultaneously post identical or substantially similar content to multiple accounts***."

- This is exactly the criteria of bots defined in our work.

[1] https://blog.twitter.com/developer/en_us/topics/tips/2018/automation-and-the-use-of-multiple-accounts.html

Who is more responsible?

- URL shortening services are responsive and **willing to cooperate**.
- Domain registrars **cannot take action** if the website is hosted on another IP.
- Domain hosting services are **unresponsive**. If they don’t take action, spammers will keep abusing other services.

Future work

- Investigate new types of malicious activities.
- Recently we found bots tweeting cryptojacking links[1]
- They are websites secretly running cryptocurrency mining script in one‘s browser, consuming CPU power.



[1] example malicious link: http://technimum.com/blog/tehlukesizlik/6554.html

Future work

- Update detection algorithm to catch new types of bots.
- Recently found bots truncating texts[1] to evade detection

9 Embarrassing Times When Selena Gomez Faced Wardrobe Malfunction
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[1] Example final landing URL: http://loveforsomething.com/s1onnq-9-malfunction-when-faced-embarrassing-gomez-times-sd24b

Conclusions

- Our unsupervised detection system detects malicious accounts and spam campaigns 24/7 without human intervention.
- Attackers and spammers are evolving and getting more sophisticated.
- Academia and Industry have to work together to develop better algorithms and to implement stricter policies.